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Ricoeur’s phenomenology of  the ego is important for contemporary
thinkers and mental health practitioners to consider because of  its
implications for conceptualizing clinical experience and re-valuing the
role of  subjectivity within it. His approach emphasizes two parallel
lines—or discourses—for understanding clients: one which evaluates
the objective data about them and another which appreciates their
subjective accomplishments. Ricoeur defends the latter discourse about
the “ego” at a time when the relevance of  the concept of  the ego has
waned in the social and human sciences. By drawing from Husserl’s
notion of  the ego, Freud’s analysis of  the unconscious, and the
existentialists’ descriptions of  intentional lived experience, Ricoeur
advances an understanding of  the ego in which the ego, though de-
centered, remains a point of  focus. Recognizing that “the notion of
identity oscillates between presumption and demand,”1 Ricoeur tries
to secure an understanding of human experience that is not “only
scientific”2 but also accounts for the human dimension unfolding “from
threshold to threshold through an increase in meaning.”3 The “ego” in
Ricoeur’s sense is thus hermeneutical as much as transcendental, unveiled
(on “the edge of  the unknown”, to cite Blanchot) as much as a privileged
center of  meaning.4
The 20th Century witnessed the rise, rule and fall of  the ego in
psychological theory. DNA, neurotransmitters, bio-chemistry and
genetics have now become the dominant concepts. It is easy to see
how the “subject’s simple liquidation”5 is likely to follow from this
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prevailing scientific view, but can the “neuronal assembly”6—the
“physical traces of  how meaning is accessed”7—give us any authentic
sense of  the individual, apart from its role in a reductionist biology? In
clinical theorizing, for example, there is little interest in the ego, which
has now become, in Borch-Jacobsen’s words, an “infinitely decentered
subject” (only the “o” of  “cogito” is preserved, and that, just barely—
specifically as the cogitatum).8 For clinicians, the more dominant ways to
conceptualize human experience are now through observable behaviors
and interactive systems. For this reason, you are likely to hear a
psychologist say about his or her work: “I am a cognitive-behavioral
therapist; I try to influence clients’ maladaptive thoughts and modify
their self-defeating patterns of  behavior; but, no, I don’t do analysis or
ego psychology; I only think about the ego in a somewhat
inconsequential sense, in reference to the client’s general concept of
self, or maybe I’ll use the word ‘ego’ as an adjective, to describe ego-
strengths.” What has brought this about?
Briefly stated, the demise of  the ego occurred in the following
way: (1) The psychoanalytic ego fell into its own black hole. In
psychoanalysis, the ego was conceptualized as secondary rather than
primary. Instead of  being an irreducible center of  experience, the ego
was said to be derived from object relations with others, relations that
were imposed on the infant in its dependency. As Freud puts it, “the
ego is not master in its own house,”9 and the “core of  our being…is
formed by the id, which has no direct relations with the external
world…”10 (2) Over time, the humanistic ego (generally conceptualized
in the third person as a “self ”) degenerated into a nebulous theoretical
construct. By and large, humanists skipped over Husserl and were bereft
of  any moorings for the ego. Wanting to bolster the ego in their clinical
work, humanistic psychologists were thus left with softly-packaged
appeals to encourage the ego-development of  clients, but had no clear
idea as to the nature of  the ego. (3) The behaviorists could not see or
measure an ego, and therefore, declared it irrelevant or non-existent.
With no need for an ego, behaviorists moved in the direction of
mechanistic models, mapping out certain responses they could stimulate
in their clients and deciding what actions to reinforce in others. There
was no need to postulate an ego, because only observable, external
behaviors were relevant. (4) Systems theorists found it more useful to
inquire into aggregate and interactive structures, like family, culture
and environment. In systems work, the primary focus is on
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communication patterns, adaptive rules and functional roles. The client’s
world is understood solely on the social level. While still retaining the
concept of  “individuation,” the ego in systems theory functions simply
as a plot on a graph. (5) The cognitive schools of  psychology, harking
all the way back to Epictetus and Descartes, revived interest in mental
processes toward the end of  the 20th Century. In doing so, however,
the notion of  the ego was not their point of  emphasis. Shying away
from the “ghost in the machine,” they described mental processes
without any reference to the activities of  a centralized ego. By now, the
ego has been refuted, reduced, replaced by chemistry, derived from id
impulses, constituted as secondary in scope, ignored, ridiculed –
essentially, pronounced dead. 11
Even while accepting the Freudian suspicions about the ego,
clinically, some of  us think that Husserl was right to assert the
importance of  the ego, an “I (who am I)”, constituting a world of
experience, more basic and vital than any psychological constructs.
Together, Freudian and Husserlian views on the ego reflect both the
tentativeness and the absoluteness of  subjectivity that constantly appears
in clinical interviews. The client is clearly pre-cast within an environment,
a particular psychological destiny and a biological lineage, while
simultaneously creating, or shaping, a world on his or her own terms.
What is needed, then, is a way to critically advance the insights of  both
Freud and Husserl. Without getting stuck in idealistic or empiricist
theorizing, Ricoeur develops a conceptual link between Freud and
Husserl. With Freud’s topology, Ricoeur is able to save the baby (i.e.
retain the entwined, layered unconscious and conscious dimensions
of  subjectivity), and with Husserl’s phenomenology he is able to make
the bathwater a little less murky (i.e. apply complicated philosophical
theory to clinical praxis).
In building the bridge between psychoanalysis and
phenomenology, Ricoeur recognizes that Freudian theory explores
important psychological phenomena but ends up with an “indefinite
self-symbolization” for the ego, with subjectivity viewed as “the series
of  its derivatives.”12 Instead of  portraying the ego either as a passive
receptacle or a theoretical construct, however, Ricoeur follows Husserl’s
key insight that there is an “oriented constitution” of  all phenomena. 13
The ego is the center of  orientation for all experiences a person might
live through, including those “unconscious” states such as repressed
memories, hidden desires, fears or instincts. As Husserl puts it, “anything
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that is—whatever its meaning and to whatever region it belongs—is
an index of  a subjective system of  correlations.”14
With Freud’s focus on the “semantics of  desire”
(accommodating the nuclear theme that, “as a man of  desires I go
forth in disguise—larvatus prodeo”),15 Ricoeur notes that psychoanalysis
can get lost too easily “in the vicissitudes of  instincts” if  those drives
are not grounded transcendentally.16 The Freudian unconscious is
considered at its deepest levels to be pre-linguistic, as evidenced by
images in regressive dreams or paleological thought processes in
decompensated schizophrenic patients. In contrast, Husserl portrays
the unconscious as an “inconspicuous stratum”,17 “an abiding temporal
being” consisting of  “flowing changes in its typically modified manners
of  givenness within a living present” occasionally bearing “enduring
results” linked to previous experiences “from then on and not merely
during its living retention.”18 A childhood sexual trauma, for example,
may only be partially recollected in adult life but yet is constituted on
various levels, sometimes as flashbacks, other times as affects, and still
other times as panicked sensations. Noting this, Ricoeur holds that
“every mode of  appearing is correlative to a non-appearing or even a
disappearing, both signified together, co-signified, in the presumption
of  the thing itself.”19
Ricoeur uses the terms “infra” and “supra” to highlight the
contrast between the unconscious in Freud and Husserl, respectively.20
Whereas Freudian thinking attempts to burrow into the forgotten,
subterranean dimensions of  existence, Husserlian thinking maintains
an orientation toward the whole person in the living present.
Accordingly, “transcendental subjectivity” for Ricoeur should be
considered the “locus or the heart of  the rules governing interpretation”
of  the unconscious.21 The raw, pre-linguistic unconscious can then be
suspended as to its “immediate meaning, or rather that chaos of
meaning, and the displacement of apparent meaning and its
meaninglessness into the field of  deciphering.”22 Ricoeur explains that
psychoanalysis, as an “exegetical science,” has a narrower path than
phenomenology: to examine “the relationships of  meaning between
substitute objects and the primordial (and lost) instinctual objects”23
from a person’s past and then to discover “what takes precedence in
the order of  distortion or disguise”24 in a particular person’s life. The
interpretive approach of  psychoanalysis, advocated by Ricoeur, is
intended to draw the hidden meaning of  unconscious phenomena
back to a constituting ego. So, while Freudian research into the
TIM DAVIDSON
86
unconscious is an “epoche in reverse”, a “reduction of  consciousness”,
Husserl’s epoche is a “reduction to consciousness.”25
For Ricoeur, like Husserl, the “psyche” is a “constituted region
woven into the surrounding world of  the pure ego.”26 Psychoanalytic
theorists, in Ricoeur’s view, are usually concerned “more with the ego’s
submission than with its striving”27 and thereby tend to ignore the
truth of  subjectivity: the ego in its basic sense is not a thing to be
battered by id impulses and conditioned by super ego constraints but
“a living being, which from all time has, as the horizon of  all its
intentions, a world, the world.”28  For Ricoeur, following Husserl’s
teaching, the pure ego, then, should be understood as this “primal
interiority”, that “irreducible core.”29
Ricoeur, of  course, pays close attention not only to Freud but
also to the lessons of  Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty in his
understanding that the ego is, first of  all, ‘there’ ‘in-the world,’ tied to its
body. The ego, then, is understood to be realized through its bodily
existence in the life-world, representing the primal structure from which
meaning derives. At the same time, however, he insists that the ego is
not just immersed in the world. There is an “architecture of  meaning”
in experience, that is, a “complicated intentional structure” consisting
of “a relation of meaning to meaning, of second meaning to first
meaning” even as “the first meaning disguises or reveals the second.”30
Ricoeur emphasizes that meanings are constantly established
even when one goes unaware of  them. In fact, acts of  reflection often
lag, or lurk, behind meanings. The ego, as a consciousness of  a world
which establishes the meaning of  the world, is pervasive as life unfolds.
Ricoeur writes: “Consciousness nourishes itself  by re-centering itself
around its Other: cosmos, bios, or psyche. It finds itself  by losing itself.
It finds itself  instructed and clarified after losing itself  and its
narcissism.”31 Whereas other views of  the ego in psychology lose sight
of  intentionality, Ricoeur emphasizes its fundamental role in the ego’s
functions. All of  the “architecture of  meaning” in a person’s life is
constituted intentionally - even non-intentional, unconscious and hidden
phenomena, which are initially cloaked, can be revealed in various types
of  intentionality through hermeneutic inquiry. Ricoeur makes it clear
that Husserl’s “absolute ego” is not some thing, out there in the world,
to be dismantled while living… or to be preserved, inevitably, in dying.
The ego is discovered only in these patterns of  meaning-formation.
An accurate image of  the ego, for Ricoeur, thus leads us “not to a
terminus but to a threshold.”32
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While Ricoeur thinks of  psychoanalysis as research back into
“sedimented consciousness” or an archaeology of  the ego, he follows
the existential emphasis on the future orientation of  being-in-the world
as well. Ricoeur describes this as a teleology of  the ego and even leaves
open the possibility of  an eschatology of  the ego, trying to cast human
consciousness as unfolding indefinitely from its finite embodiment
toward infinity.33 Ricoeur’s portrayal of  the ego, as open to an infinite
horizon, highlights the living person’s potentiality rather than his or
her physically or socially-defined realities. The ego is provisional—with
its questionable, hidden past and its uncertain future—but with the
same brushstroke, necessary for the formation of  meaning. The ego’s
search for meaning is the reason why, according to Ricoeur, “the human
sciences may be said to be hermeneutical.”34
For clinicians, this emphasis on “meaning-formation” as a
central way of  understanding an ego immersed in the world is more
useful than thinking of  the ego either as a rational core fending off
anxieties and disconnected from impulses or as some psychological
construct that needs coddling in order to ensure its well-being. Meaning
is entangled just as fully in the irrational, the bodily, the as-yet undisclosed,
and the collective as it is in the reasonable, mentally managed, previously
recognized and singular. With this hermeneutical approach to the ego,
Ricoeur encourages philosophers and psychologists alike to understand
human experience systematically, to “question back from uttered
meaning to meaning in operation.”35 The goal is to listen carefully to
the communicated message, search for its meaning, and recognize the
communicator’s intentionality at some level of  experience. “What we
understand first in discourse,” Ricoeur notes, “is not another person,
but a project, that is, the outline of  a new being-in-the world.”36 For
example, consider three utterances: the first from a politician, the second
from a songwriter, and the third from a schizophrenic patient.
(1) The politician says, “We will be greeted as liberators”37
and we hear the utterance as understandable, a validity
claim that needs to be verified; it may be wrong, culturally
uniformed and arrogant, but it still seems clear, distinct,
and marked by a coherence often associated with
rationality. The hermeneutical effort rests on exploring
the context for such a statement, acquiring more facts,
gaining a perspective on media spin, and weighing the
impact of  public consensus regarding truthfulness.
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(2) The artist sings, “I fought against the bottle, but I had
to do it drunk. Took my diamond to the pawn shop, but
that don’t make it junk,”38 and we immediately begin to
decipher a meaning based on our past experiences; the
language is playful, with double meanings; our
imaginations are activated. The hermeneutical effort rests
on an appreciation of poetic license and an understanding
of  addiction and nouveau poverty.
(3) The schizophrenic person writes in his journal,
“product of  held 2 screwplate on chair. Chromcraft
Corporation St. Louis 20 Mo. …Don’t overlook perl’s in
swine. Don’t swallow a nat and eat a whale. Science is a
slave. Science is an emotion drive…”39 When he hands us
his journal and we try to understand what this patient
means, we do not know if  he is uttering something
intended to be understandable in a public arena at the
time it was written, or if  he is giving us anything more
than a jumble of  phrases. Maybe the act of  sharing the
journal is where the meaning lies, rather than the specific
words. The hermeneutical effort rests on interpretation,
empathic positioning, relationship development, medical
analysis and knowledge of  schizophrenic thought
processes.
The politician comes across as purposeful and presumptive; the
songwriter as poetic and humorous; and the patient as psychotic and
un-medicated. From Ricoeur’s perspective, though, all three
communicators are constituting egos, laying out a field of  meaning,
within a temporal horizon, in a shared world. The politician is not just
a mouthpiece; the songwriter is not just damaged goods; and the
schizophrenic is not just a patient within a hospital system.
In clinical work, we regularly diagnose, consider demographics,
and apply standardized assessments as part of  the therapeutic enterprise.
An ongoing challenge for clinicians is not to objectify the client too
extensively and not to portray the client just as a profile, a grouping of
symptoms. Of  course, the client’s mental status is a constant feature of
the intersubjective moment, always ‘there’, awaiting the reflective turn
of  the clinician: the client’s emotional states; overt behaviors; motor
status; facial expressions; orientation to person, time and place; the
process of presenting ideas; the content of that thought; or the capacity
of  memory, intellectual function and insight. Yet, all these ingredients—
RICOEUR’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE EGO
89
the stuff  of  biology and psychology—do not add up to equal what
Ricoeur highlights in the ego.
Ricoeur’s phenomenological impulse is to approach the client
holistically. No matter how elaborately the data of  a person’s life are
scrutinized, organized and categorized, what is measured only gives
the clinician a profile of  the person. When someone speaks (or signifies
non-verbally), professionalized discourse can readily cover over the
“project” of  another person and therein objectify (even eliminate) the
constituting ego in favor of  a third-person point of  view. But Ricoeur
points beyond such objectification to a hermeneutics of  unveiling, where
the constituting ego is immeasurable. In language, “a self  announces
itself  before a world”40 and, to use Buber’s phrase, calls for an “I-
Thou” meeting “where meaning is to be found…in this ‘between’ which
they live together.”41 Ricoeur’s phenomenology emphasizes that human
experience is fundamentally defined once we recognize and honor our
own “presence” and the “co-presence” of  others in the world. As
constituting egos, we are thrown into existence. Once here, we are
constantly tugged toward non-being, toward eradication of  our identity
and toward vanity rather than authenticity. Even so, Ricoeur urges us,
in theory and in daily practice, to value subjectivity, neither ignoring the
other as ego, nor disregarding our own “egological foundation.”42
Is this notion of  the ego defensible?  Will it be a useful way to
describe the subject for clinicians hoping to maintain conceptual integrity
in an era when spiritual, humanist and rationalist perspectives are
consistently deconstructed and abandoned? Some might think of  the
pure ego, in Husserl’s and Ricoeur’s work, as a false image: an abstracted
ghost in spiritual or theological terms, an unnecessary construct in
psychological terms, or a pretense in existential terms. Ricoeur, however,
lays claim to the ego as the basis for a genuine, individual sense of
being. In so doing, Ricoeur reminds us that we are more than the sum
of  our mental and physical parts.  This ‘something more’ is posed, not
as a mere abstraction, but as a feature of  concrete existing.
Ricoeur recognizes the concept of  “spirit” as a valid way of
thinking about this “something more.” This term, for him, is “endowed
with a polysemy that is very rich on the plane of  subjective experience”
whether used in the “general sense of  the mental” (including
“intentionality, meaning, communicability, and mutual
understanding”…the terms emphasized in this discussion), or as an
“inspired dimension” (a purified form of  “integral experience”), or
under the heading of  the “transcendental” (as meant by medieval
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philosophers to refer to “that which aims at the true, the good, the just,
the beautiful”).43 All of  these senses of  the term “spirit” can benefit a
clinical practice that strives for humanizing moments while still being
rooted in scientific facts.
With this understanding of  the ego, Ricoeur is also lending
support to a moral argument that every person is of  ultimate value. At
one point, Ricoeur hints that “the vague term, the ‘sacred’,”44 could be
applied to the ego. If  Ricoeur’s nod toward the ego as sacred is tenable
as a phenomenological insight, it must include the provision that only
by living in the mundane, profane, sensual world of  other subjects will
the sacred be realized. That is really the point for clinical work:
recognition of  the ego’s “absoluteness” should not detract from the
ego’s brokenness or vulnerability as the ego “objectifies itself…as an
element of  the world.”45; conversely, the most mentally and emotionally
disabled person should still be recognized to be “functioning
ultimately”46 as a kindred spirit.
Social scientists and clinicians need—as much today as ever
before—a way to conceptualize human experience rigorously but yet
as uniquely personal and valuable. Paul Ricoeur’s phenomenology of
the ego lays out just such a theoretical foundation.
        University of  Oklahoma
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